

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

29 April 1954

2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of 28 April 1954

Present: Ambassador Peurifoy, Ambassador Willauer, Mr. Roosevelt,
and Mr. []

1. Ambassador Peurifoy recommended that both he and Ambassador Willauer be advised as to D-Day and that they be sounded out approximately 10 days before. Mr. [] noted the difficulty of such change of views by cable and suggested that it might be more effective to accomplish the Ambassador's objectives by sending down at that time an individual [] to consult directly with the Ambassadors. Mr. [] suggested that Mr. Leddy was best suited for such a task.
2. With regard to the problem of sabotaging Honduranian aircraft, Ambassador Willauer proposed [] as a person qualified and experienced for the assignment. He suggested that [] availability could be ascertained through []. Mr. [] suggested that it was unfortunate that Col. Acosta himself was unable to do anything to stop the sabotage especially since he had a suspect in view and that this gave little basis for hoping that a lone American could do better. Mr. [] raised the question as to whether RUFUS could not supply an individual. Ambassador Willauer observed that RUFUS is in direct contact with Acosta through Flores.
3. Both Ambassadors were questioned re: view of emergency communication links available to them in their respective countries.
4. Ambassador Peurifoy proposed again leaflet drops and sabotage prior to D-Day. The necessity was pointed out that of decided security in such actions would be premature and precipitate an opportunity for our readiness to exploit it. Mr. [] advised Ambassador Peurifoy that railroad and Polwel targets had been pin-pointed by LINCOLN following the Ambassador's recommendation of last week.
5. Ambassador Willauer asked what are the alternates to []
6. Ambassador Peurifoy was briefed on the oral report received with regard to the reported entry by unknown persons of a letter addressed to him. He was advised that this oral report was not conducive and that the written report would be passed to him in due course. Mr. [] proposed that we be permitted to consider for recommendation to Ambassador Peurifoy the use of this channel for deception purposes which would have as their primary objective the disinvolvement of the embassy from revolutions rumored to be afoot.

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7. Ambassador Willauer proposed that gasoline tank trucks [] could transport the arms to their points of disbursement. Messrs Roosevelt and [] raised a number of practical and security barriers to such a program.

8. With regard to PBSUCCESS in his area, Ambassador Willauer made the following observations:

a. That RUFUS' safehouse is across the street from the Ambassador's first secretary's residence. He asked whether RUFUS' location could be changed.

b. Operating difficulties in Tegucigalpa are most severe because of the size of the town and the small number of visiting Americans. Tourists' cover is not adequate for our people; in any case that cover has been used up by them and moreover that they are not behaving as tourists.

c. Mr. [] is too young and inexperienced and while doing a fine job considering his capabilities, another senior individual should serve as [] and contact to Willauer.

d. Ontrich while active and imaginative is not appropriate by age or background to deal with the president. The president had raised to Willauer some objection to dealing with Ontrich whom he described as a "boy."

e. The need for the plane which he had proposed to the agency several months ago still exists. In addition to the craft he can supply a CAT pilot and crew chief. We could supply the copilot and radio operator through his gaining excellent cover and an opportunity to have frequent contact with him.

f. He requested arms for 20 persons including his four marines, and \$5,000 for emergency use in connection with the safety of U.S. official persons.

9. With regard to the operation in his area, Ambassador Peurifoy requested the following:

a. A check on the status of the 3 additional people proposed for his embassy.

b. Heavy and light weapons for his staff in addition to the 30 revolvers already dispatched.

c. \$10,000 into his hands for use in connection with protection of American lives.

d. Ambassador Willauer noted that Eric W. Watts, the Director of Jardine Mathisson and Company and Manager of their Japanese office will visit him beginning mid-May. Ambassador Willauer said this could probably not be put off. A May trip is requested.

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10. With regard to the possibility that [] may sever diplomatic relations over the Duarte affair, it was Ambassador Peurifoy's view that it could not be undesirable at this time, although he had some months ago recommended against such a sever of relations. Mr. [] pointed out that such an action by [] would increase our own security because subsequent disturbances would probably in many people's minds be credited to him.

11. Mr. [] raised again with Ambassador Peurifoy the delicate and complex problems involved in the post operational period, and repeated Mr. Wisner's statements to the effect that department advice and assistance is needed. The Ambassador stated he would have recommendations forwarded to us. He noted that the main problem had to do with the difficulty security wise of making an assessment of RUFUS' acceptability and viability in the area.

Ed. The above notes do not pretend to cover the entire discussion, the nature of which was not conducive to usual reporting.

[]
DC/WH

Attachment

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ACTION - Keyed to Memorandum for the Record dated 29 April 1954

1. Tuesday Staff Meeting.
2. Mr. Esterline to proceed with [] individual he proposes; at same time ascertaining cover possibility.
3. Action: [] Ambassador Peurifoy advised 29 April.
4. Tuesday Staff Meeting.
5. Action: [] Answer: Las Mercedes, Nicaragua.
6. Action: [] Done 29 April.
7. Tuesday Meeting.
8. a. Tuesday Meeting - [] advises that RUFUS was there first.
b. - e. Tuesday Meeting.
f. [] Prepared for DD/P April 29.
9. a. Action: [] Ambassador advised 29 April.
b. Action: [] Requisition forwarded DD/P, 29 April.
c. Action: [] Prepared for DD/P, 30 April.
d. Action: Mr. Esterline - Appropriate trace initiated 29 April.
10. Action: [] Forwarded 29 April to Leddy for comment.
11. Tuesday Meeting.

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Action Items taken up at PRESUCCESS meeting of 29 April 1954
(resulting from a trip taken by DD/P and SA/DCI - Mr. Bissell
to LINCOLN on 28 April.)

Present at meeting: Mr. Helms, Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Bissell,
Colonel King, []
and []

1. Reimbursement to the Marines -- Action: []
2. Approach to the Marines for courier use of planes -- Action: []
and General Balmer, etc.
3. Slots and grade problem for LINCOLN station personnel - Robertson
in particular -- Action: []
4. LINCOLN request for an additional C-47 and an additional crew.
Action: []
5. Request made by Mr. Wisner to LINCOLN when he was there for the
following:
 - a. D-Day Operational Plan.
 - b. Paper on additional internal military strength
figures to be provided.

(Both of these papers due from Mr. Barnes not later than Tuesday,
4 May 1954.) Action: Mr. Barnes.

6. Security, cover and deception. LINCOLN now considering memorandum
written by Mr. Wisner while at LINCOLN entitled "Ways and Means of
Improving Cover and Deception for SUCCESS Operation." Also, copies
of this memorandum have been furnished to Mr. Helms, Mr. Roosevelt,
Mr. Bissell, Colonel King, [] and [] for their
consideration and recommendations. LINCOLN is to advise us whether
or not they plan to use any of the suggestions contained in this
memorandum.
7. Position of Rason. Action: []
get in touch with [] before he leaves on his visit to see
[] in the next day or two. [] is to persuade []
to stay with us on this.
8. (Mr. Bissell's suggestion) Prepare a brief memorandum for the files
on the amount of time that has been lost here as a result of the
hassling around by State on the policy issue. If the operation
should fail, we could use this as evidence. Action: Mr. Esterline,
Mr. Wisner and Mr. Bissell. Mr. Esterline to find the first cable
which we sent to the field telling them we were having difficulty
with State and send it to Mr. Wisner who in turn will prepare a
first draft of the memorandum with Mr. Bissell preparing the final
draft.

9. Use of [] It is LINCOLN's conclusion that until they had a reply from [] which they were expecting momentarily, they would like to see this question kept open. Action: Colonel King. (Colonel King has talked to [] and knows the full story on this. He should keep in mind the fact that [] has not been to Guatemala since 1949.) Also, Ambassador Pourifoy is most enthusiastic about this.
10. The messages that tell the story of how the trap was set for the police chief (which LINCOLN got together and gave to FGM while he was there) should look good to Mr. Holland. Action: Mr. Bissell. (Mr. Bissell to write a memorandum of operations and accomplishments in the field of political and psychological warfare reciting some of the actual successes we have had.)

11. For headquarters:

- a. See to it that there is a much broader external exploitation of the "32 campaign."
- b. Keep alive and play up if necessary the Guatemalan attempt on the life of Somoza and what Arbenz may have in mind vis-a-vis other countries - softer areas such as Mexico, Chile, Costa Rica, etc.

Action: Mr. Bissell and [] Ambassador Pourifoy.

[] Remember to mention it to

12. Maps. Mr. Wisner asked Mr. Esterline to prepare two maps. One should be fairly detailed and should include the road network, railroads, communications, etc. of Guatemala. Also, the names and locations of the nine garrison towns should be on this map. The second map should be of Guatemala and surrounding countries to take in up to the Mexican border and down to the Panamanian border. Action: Mr. Esterline.

Mr. Bissell's points.

13. LINCOLN is interested in recruiting a few military personnel in Colombia - volunteer Colombian Korean war veterans. LINCOLN recommended that headquarters give this a strong push. Action: Mr. Bissell and [] (knows the full story on this as he initiated it originally.) Mr. Bissell will discuss this with [] and also check to see what, if anything, IO has done on this.

14. The Voice of the Army. Mr. Wisner is now convinced after talking with LYNCOLE personnel that several of Mr. Leddy's objections to this are without foundation. Action: Mr. Bissell.
15. The idea of sending a labor man down to Guatemala to talk with labor people down there. Action: Mr. Bissell. He will talk to IO on this.

Orig: SA/DOJ - Mr. Bissell

cc: C/OPS

A/DD/P/P

C/WH

DC/WH

Mr. C

JWH

Mr. Esterline, WH ✓